Under Trump, is the US no longer interested in playing maritime referee?

The delay in the release of the US Navy’s annual report on freedom of navigation could signal a change in the country’s strategic approach.

For decades, the US Navy’s annual Freedom of Navigation Report has served as a key document of US maritime policy, detailing naval challenges to what Washington views as the “excessive maritime claims” of various coastal states, particularly China.

The conspicuous absence of the annual report for the US fiscal year 2024, still unpublished as of August 10, is a telling indicator of the seemingly shifting strategic priorities under US President Donald Trump’s second term. Its notable delay, combined with the absence of confirmed reports of South China Sea freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) since Trump’s return to the White House, points to a significant recalibration of US maritime policy.

I believe the lack of the annual FONOP report reflects at least three interconnected developments: the Trump administration’s overwhelming focus on pressing geopolitical crises in global flashpoints at the expense of long-term maritime strategy, the disruptive effects of domestic budget cuts to diplomatic institutions and a strategic reluctance to strain already fragile alliances further.

Together, these factors suggest a deliberate, if unacknowledged, retreat from the US’ traditional role as the primary enforcer of the so-called rules-based international maritime order, particularly in the South China Sea. Since taking office for a second term in January this year, Trump has been preoccupied by high-stakes geopolitical challenges, leaving little room for sustained engagement in the South China Sea.

Indeed, Trump’s major attention has been dominated by attempts to mediate a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire, manage the consequences of what some have called his “economic nuclear war” and control the volatile Israel-Hamas conflict as well as counter Iran. Portrayed as a broker of peace, Trump seems to have enjoyed his new role over the past six months.

Historical records of the US’ FONOPs also underscore this strategic shift. During Trump’s first term, the US Navy conducted an average of seven FONOPs a year that targeted China, challenging China’s “excessive maritime claims”, totalling at least 27 operations from May 2017 to December 2020. By contrast, the first six months of his second term have witnessed zero confirmed reports of FONOPs in the South China Sea.

This inactivity coincides with the delay of the annual report for fiscal year 2024, which now exceeds even the Covid-19 related postponement of the release of the annual report for fiscal year 2019 in July 2020. This leads to an unmistakable assertion that maritime issues have fallen sharply on Trump’s list of strategic priorities, at least in the South China Sea.

The report’s delay may also reflect the Trump administration’s sweeping domestic reforms, particularly its drastic federal budget cuts. The “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” has significantly reduced funding for key diplomatic and defence offices, including the State Department’s Office of Multilateral Affairs, which played a central role in coordinating Indo-Pacific security policy. This downsiszing may have left fewer personnel and resources available to compile the FONOP report. The programme is traditionally a collaborative effort between the Pentagon and the State Department.

Gregory Poling of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) warned in his June testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific that these cuts risk signalling a US withdrawal from multilateral diplomacy. The erosion of institutional capacity raises serious questions about the US ability to formulate and execute coherent maritime policies moving forward.

Furthermore, it can be inferred that the annual report’s content could exacerbate tensions with key allies already strained by Trump’s “America First” approach. For example, detailing challenges to Japan’s maritime claims could complicate sensitive negotiations over US military basing rights. Similarly, highlighting operations against European allies’ maritime claims might fuel existing disagreements over trade and burden-sharing.

The administration’s caution reflects a delicate balancing act: while demanding greater contributions from allies across Asia and Europe, Trump also needs their cooperation on priorities like containing Russia and isolating China. Therefore, publishing a report that publicly disputes allies’ maritime claims could further undermine these efforts, reinforcing perceptions of US unreliability.

Compounding these factors is the looming expiration of the report’s domestic legal mandate. Section 1275 of the 2017 National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA), which established the reporting requirement and a sunset clause, was originally set to expire in December 2021 but was extended to December 2025 owing to an extension in Section 1209 of the 2021 NDAA. Notably, the 2025 NDAA adopted in December 2024 failed to renew this provision, raising the possibility that the Trump administration may allow the requirement to lapse entirely.

Considering that Trump has consistently criticised bureaucratic formalities since his return to the White House, the FONOP report’s disappearance would align with his preference for dramatic, headline-grabbing actions over systematic policy transparency. If the annual FONOP report for fiscal year 2024 never materialises, it may mark the quiet end of a decades-old tradition and a symbolic retreat from US leadership on maritime norms.

The missing FONOP report represents more than an administrative oversight; it encapsulates the Trump 2.0 foreign policy doctrine: Trump’s focus on immediate crises, domestic budget cuts and alliance management has crowded out maritime assertiveness. Whether this reflects deliberate strategy or chaotic neglect remains unclear, but the consequences are already apparent.

In the end, if the annual FONOP report disappears permanently, it will signal a historic shift: one where the US abandons its role as the world’s maritime referee in favour of a narrower, crisis-driven foreign policy. From the perspective of upholding the “international law-based order”, this might indeed be seen as a welcome development

Source: South China Morning Post， August 11, 2025

Author: Bao Yinan, Associate Research Fellow, Huayang Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance